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Samantha Ashenden, Birkbeck College 
Who is the ‘real’ mother? Replacement and the politics of surrogacy1 
 
 
‘There is something so shocking in a child’s being taken away from his parents and natural home! […] 
To give up one’s child! I really never could think well of anybody who proposed such a thing’ (Austen 
1966: 68). Jane Austen’s character Isabella Knightley, quoted here, highlights both differences and 
similarities between the eighteenth century and our present ways of imagining filiation. At the time, it 
was possible to have more than two parents, and those with money and influence could have this 
recognised in law. Witness Jane’s brother Edward.2 Edward was adopted as their heir by Thomas and 
Catherine Knight in 1783, when he was sixteen. Edward’s parents were ‘on the fringes of the gentry’ 
(Fergus: 5) and, in a world keen to preserve estates and names, heirs were often imported via 
adoption. In fact, until the mid-nineteenth century adoptions were mostly undertaken to establish 
heirs and most of those adopted would already have achieved adulthood (United Nations 2009: 11). 
Austen’s text registers that in the late eighteenth century this was beginning to give way to a 
sentimental and protective attitude to children:3 Jane was initially horrified that Edward had to take 
the Knight family name as a condition of his inheritance of the Godmersham Park Estate (see Honan 
1987), but such arrangements were a regular occurrence in a world that still had a functioning 
aristocracy.  
 
Edward Austen’s adoption was effected just the other side of a Sattelzeit that divides his world 
from ours.4 The late eighteenth century was a time of flux. This was especially so with respect to 
ideas of filiation. Ludmilla Jordanova points out that in the eighteenth century reproduction was in 
transition, and that ‘the middling sort’ were active in ‘constructing naturalised categories through 
which social relations could be imagined and managed’ (371). It was then that children, previously 
‘“naturally”’ associated with their fathers, came to be associated with their mothers (373). In the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century kinship is being reconfigured again, with particular 
implications for the role of mothers.  
 
While people may no longer expect to inherit social standing from their families, ‘hereditability 
of personal attributes has been amplified within the past century’ (Finkler: 44). This is a period that 
has been termed ‘the century of the gene’ (see Fox Keller 2002). Foucault highlights the late 
eighteenth century as exactly the moment when the aristocracy’s ‘symbolics of blood’’ gave way to 
the bourgeoisie’s ‘analytics of sexuality’ (1979: 147, emphasis in text). In fact we might say that a 
key difference between the eighteenth century and ours is that, whereas the former operated 
through a symbolics of blood, the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have seen the 
emergence of the analytics of the gene. In this, as we will see, ‘blood’ is still regularly deployed as a 




Periods of instability can produce new levels of self-consciousness, but they can also lead to 
intense pressures to naturalise key concepts and practices. This is perhaps particularly so with respect 
to reproduction and filiation since the ways we imagine and act on these are regarded as central to 
social and political order. Kinship has come to be understood as a set of biogenetic ties, and this 
combined with developments in new reproductive technologies [NRTs] means that, notwithstanding 
the principle mater semper certa est [the mother is always certain], the identity of a child’s mother is 
no longer obvious (fatherhood has always been uncertain, as expressed in the principles pater 
semper incertus est [the father is always uncertain] and pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant [the 
father is he whom the marriage points out]). But the idea that the ‘gestational carrier’ is not the ‘real’ 
mother expresses a particular, biomedical and genetically inflected view of personhood. It is to the 
problem of motherhood and replacement that this essay is addressed. In particular, the purpose of 
this paper is to trace the replacement, displacement, and possible multiplication of mothers in the 
contemporary politics of surrogacy. I seek to plot the shape of some of the new changes, the role of 
law in them, and the to-and-fro between new developments and moments when the ghosts of old 
metaphors are made, often uncomfortably, to do new work. 
 
 
The OED defines a surrogate as ‘a person or thing taking the place of another; a substitute’. The 
word surrogate entered English from Latin in the seventeenth century, where it was used to denote 
those deputising for another, especially for a judge or bishop.5 Since the 1970s the term has been 
applied to ‘a woman who bears a child on behalf of another woman, either from her own egg 
fertilized by the other woman’s partner or from the implantation in her womb of a fertilised egg from 
the other woman’ (Oxford English Dictionary).6 While the practice is old, going back at least to the 
Book of Genesis in the Hebrew Bible in the form of the slave Hagar carrying the child Ishmael for 
Abraham and Sarah, it has become an issue of intense concern of late, as a result both of 
technological developments and of the growth of markets in reproductive services.  
 
One way to understand the character of the replacement that occurs in reproductive practices 
involving surrogacy is to look at its legal regulation.7 In the UK, this currently occurs under the 
Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 [hereafter 
HFEA 1990], as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 [hereafter HFEA 
2008]. This regulatory framework reflects entrenched ambivalence concerning surrogacy. The 1985 
Act outlaws commercial surrogacy but allows altruistic surrogacy where no payment takes place, or 
where only ‘reasonable expenses’ are paid.8 In the UK private surrogacy agreements are legal but not 
binding; section 26 of the HFEA 1990 specifies that ‘no surrogacy arrangement is enforceable by or 
against any of the persons making it’. Section 27(1) of the 1990 Act (s. 33(1) of the HFEA 2008) 
provides that the ‘woman who is carrying or has carried a child as a result of the placing in her of an 
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embryo or of sperm and eggs, and no other woman, is to be treated as the mother of the child’. 
Section 28 of the 1990 Act (s. 35 of the HFEA 2008) specifies that the surrogate’s husband or, after 
April 2009, civil partner is to be treated as the father as long as he consented to the procedure. 
Where the surrogate mother is single, the commissioning father can be recognised as the legal father 
if he is named on the birth-certificate; however, in order to acquire legal parenthood and extinguish 
the parenthood status of the surrogate (and her husband or partner if she has one) the 
commissioning parents must apply to court for a parental order (s. 30 HFEA 1990, replaced by s. 54 
of the HFEA 2008). This requires that at least one of the intended parents have a genetic link to the 
child. The 2008 Act, which came into force in 2010, removed the restriction of parental orders to 
married couples. Unmarried and same sex couples (but not single people) may now apply for this 
faster route to post-birth parenthood (previously those outside marriage seeking parenthood 
following a birth through surrogacy would have to apply to adopt the child). Notably, despite this 
element of liberalisation, the 2008 Act continues to assert that a child can have a maximum of two 
parents and requires at least one of them to prove a genetic connection to the child.  
 
Therefore while the fragmentation of parenthood brought about by NRTs opens up the 
possibility of recognising multiple parents, the logic of law is to reduce this multiplicity. This reduction 
is directed towards the normative ideal of two parents, at least one of whom has a genetic connection 
to the child. Thus, notwithstanding the variety of ways in which people can be ‘parents’, legislation 
surrounding surrogacy (and NRTs in general) espouses a particularly genetic conception of the parent 
(see Johnson 2003: 93). As we shall see, this has some startling consequences for women’s capacity 
to be recognised as parents of children born as the result of such agreements. We can examine this 
more closely by looking at how metaphors of ‘blood’ work to designate parental status in recent legal 
cases.  
 
The concept of the ‘blood-tie’ is an interesting feature of both popular discourse and legal 
judgments concerning parent-child relationships, but conceptions of ‘blood’ have been reconfigured 
dramatically in the face of the science of genetics. The ‘blood-tie’ has long been legally and culturally 
important in symbolising filiation,9 but blood offers an unstable metaphoricity. Slightly amending 
Foucault’s discussion of the symbolics of blood, noted at the outset, what we see in recent legal 
reasoning concerning parenthood in contexts of surrogacy is the continuation of the metaphor of 
blood, but where the meanings attached to the word ‘blood’ have been transformed. Before DNA 
testing the understanding of filiation symbolised by the concept of the blood-tie was one that 
construed connections more in terms of the inheritance of property than physical and psychological 
attributes per se, though these were important too (see Finkler 2000, ch 4). In a world of genetics, 
‘blood’ – an archaic word – is now regularly used as a synonym for shared genetic inheritance. 
Historically, the ‘blood-tie’ (or what we now know as shared genes) has been, and often still is, 
ignored by law in determining parenthood. So, for example, until 1840 an illegitimate child was filius 
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nullius [a son of nobody], a position that reflected the concern to uphold patrilineal descent regarding 
property (Smart 1987: 101, also Maclean 1994). Marriage, not blood, continues to confer paternity in 
the rebuttable presumption10 that a man married to a woman is the father of her children; in other 
words, law/custom rather than biology creates the legal relationship between fathers and children. 
However, with the advent of DNA testing this presumption is now supplemented by claims resting on 
genetic parentage. For women, the situation is different. The principle mater semper certa est 
continues the assumption that the mother of a child is the woman who bore it. The advent of DNA 
tests and the possibility of egg donation have not interrupted this; in particular the HFEA 2008 
explicitly rules out the possibility that a woman is to be recognised as a parent ‘merely because of 
egg donation’ (HFEA 2008 s.47 – italics added). This produces marked differences in the legal 
implications of NRTs for men and for women, regarding the acquisition of parental status.  
 
A woman with a genetic connection to a child but who has not given birth to it cannot gain 
legal recognition as a parent other than through a parental order or adoption. A man who has a 
genetic connection can be on the birth-certificate provided the surrogate is unmarried. Where once 
fatherhood was a socio-legal ‘fact’, it has become increasingly predicated on intent and genetic 
contribution. But for women the principle that the woman who gives birth to the child is its mother 
interrupts such a re-framing. They have no way to assert a genetic tie (other than through a male 
partner if they have one) since the principle mater semper certa est breaks this in a way that it does 
not for men. Therefore we can say that NRTs and their legal framings parcel out parenthood 
differently for men and for women, and more specifically male gametes are recognised as 
determining parenthood in law more easily than female ones.11 In arguments in which genetics are 
increasingly made to be the measure of filiation, a woman’s contributions are often occluded even 
when they are genetic. 
 
The claim to legal authenticity in respect of parenthood is grounded in exclusion, so that some 
of those contributing to the coming into being of a child are legally effaced, replaced by a normatively 
prized two-person parenting unit. In this respect it is significant that the HFEA 2008, an Act of 
Parliament directly addressing the multiplications produced by NRTs, continues to hold that a child 
can have a maximum of two parents. Whilst this legislation broke with the requirement that this must 
be one man and one woman, recognising same-sex parents for the first time, it nonetheless held on 
to what McCandless and Sheldon (2010: 177), following Fineman (1995) describe as the ‘sexual 
family’ form (Fineman 1995: 143). This is the model of the two-parent sexual couple. McCandless and 
Sheldon trace in some detail how, during the passage of the HFE Act 2008, and in the face of 
widespread disagreement concerning the grounds on which parents should be recognised, 
‘acceptance of the fact that we can have two – and only two – “real” parents has proved a unifying 
article of faith’ (2010: 190). Thus whilst it might look at first sight like a major departure, the 
extension of recognition of parenthood to female civil partners of women who give birth undertaken 
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by the 2008 Act in fact represents the attempted assimilation of civil partnerships to the idea(l) of 
marriage, it is not a radically new way of recognising parent-child ties (McCandless and Sheldon 
2010: 189; see also Diduck 2007). A number of difficulties of language indicate some of the ways in 
which this legislation strains to encompass new forms of procreation and family formation. 
 
One of the more interesting features of this new provision for the recognition of same-sex 
parents is the way in which it works via rebuttable presumption, for this legal formulation enables the 
ghost of old ideas of filiation to structure new family forms. To elaborate, under the terms of the 
HFEA 2008, where two women are in a registered civil partnership or marriage, the partner of the 
woman who gives birth will be recognised as the child’s ‘other parent’ unless it can be shown that she 
did not consent to the treatment or artificial insemination (HFEA 2008 s. 42). This directly mirrors 
agreed fatherhood conditions under the Act (2008 s. 35), but it also strongly echoes the old common 
law presumption of paternity. However, in cases involving same sex parents it does so in the face of 
knowledge of a lack of genetic relationship (unless the other ‘female parent’ is also the egg donor 
though, as noted, egg donation in itself carries no rights of recognition); thus in this instance, rather 
than the attribution of parenthood status following from a presumption of paternity, as with 
heterosexual marriage, law prescribes a relation in the context of the known absence of any genetic 
tie. In the provisions of the HFEA 2008, therefore, we can see an attempt to re-imagine parental 
dimorphism in the face of multiplicity and same-sex relations. This is most clearly articulated in the 
strained language used to describe one mother plus one gender-neutral parent: motherhood remains 
grounded in gestation and so ‘the price to pay for the reward of children becomes conformity to the 
nuclear family ideal’ (Smart 1987: 100). The ‘de-gendered “parent” is [still] opaque’ (Diduck 2007: 5). 
 
There is inherent substitutability in the ‘surrogate’s’ role. This substitutability of the surrogate 
as a ‘gestational carrier’ continues a long line of thinking about reproduction in which the birth-
mother is an arbitrary vessel (see Laqueur 1990) and stands in sharp contrast to the pressure toward 
the importance of those considered to be ‘biological’ (meaning genetic) and/or intended parents. 
While there may be no (legal) problem when the surrogate remains a ‘substitute’, i.e. hands over the 
baby after the birth, considerable problems open up when the woman who has carried the child 
changes her mind and decides she wishes to keep it. In such cases ‘surrogate’ mothers overstep the 
surrogate role and make a claim to being the ‘real’ mother, something they may fail to enforce even 
when they are also the genetic mother. Such was the case in Re N.12 In this case, a woman had 
offered herself as a ‘surrogate’ but told the commissioning couple that she had lost the baby early in 
the pregnancy, whilst going on to give birth and keep the child as her own. When the case came 
before the courts the baby, known as N, was 18 months old, and was settled with the birth mother 
and her husband. The judge asserted the equivalence of the claim to parenthood of the birth mother 
and the commissioning father , on the basis of the ‘blood-tie’, and went on to judge the case on the 
basis of N’s interests, which were deemed best served by residence with the commissioning couple. 
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Thus the ‘blood-tie’ was reduced by the Court to genetic contribution. This case was decided on the 
principle of ‘best interests’, but one cannot help thinking that the ‘surrogate’ effectively became a 
scapegoat: a woman who enters a surrogacy agreement deceptively, notwithstanding legislation 
providing that she is the legal mother of the child at the point of birth, oversteps the line and makes a 
claim to be the ‘real’ mother; for this she is punished (for a more detailed discussion see Ashenden 
2013).  
 
In recent discussions of surrogacy the ‘biological’ is regularly reduced to the ‘genetic’ (or the 
‘blood-tie’ where this concept is used as a synonym for genetic tie), thus occluding from view other 
biological processes that are essential to reproduction. ‘Blood’ has been used to talk about inheritance 
and filiation since the middle of the thirteenth century, and to signify ‘a person of one’s family, race 
and kindred’ since the late fourteenth century (Online Etymology Dictionary). But none of these uses 
refers to genetic contribution. They cannot, since the science of genetics did not exist before the 
twentieth century. So it is worth asking what ‘gene talk’ is for, and noting that the words we use 
shape ‘landscapes of possibility’ (Fox Keller 2000: 138, 139). The use of ‘blood’ as a synonym for 
genes lends the genetic claim authority. But it is a very strange synonym, for blood signifies that 
which is spilt, which ‘swells, gushes, spurts’ (Online Etymology Dictionary), but also that which 
pollutes (see Knight 1991).13 From this perspective, conception in a test-tube looks bloodless, unlike 
the deeply embedded, embodied physicality of the placenta that feeds the foetus. It is interesting to 
note that, notwithstanding the attempt to pin the ‘blood-tie’ to genetics, in one recent case the judge 
used a different understanding of blood in his summing-up, emphasising that ‘the mother’s blood 
does not circulate within the body of the foetus while in the womb’ .14 In this case, the High Court of 
Ireland found in favour of the genetic mother’s claim to be the ‘true’ mother, but it was overturned by 
the Supreme Court which refused to endorse recognition of the genetic mother as legal parent and 
argued that it was up to the National Parliament to enact legislation that might make this possible. In 
the absence of such legislation, the ‘surrogate’ or birth-mother remains the child’s legal parent.  
 
Arguably, the examples referred to in this essay make the case for recognising the multiplicity 
inherent in the idea of collaborative conception (see Wallbank 2002). Yet a child can have a maximum 
of two parents on its birth-certificate in the UK, notwithstanding the fact that many more people may 
have been involved in its coming into being. Personhood is always symbolically mediated, and 
biological facts and normative judgements interwoven. Could Ishmael, born today, be recognised as 
the son of Hagar, Abraham and Sarah? Or would Hagar and Ishmael still be cast out following the 
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NOTES 
 
1 Thanks to Naomi Segal and James Brown for many insightful suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. 
2 Thanks to James Brown for this suggestion.  
3 On the transformation of childhood since the eighteenth century see Zelizer 1985, Cunningham 2006.  
4 Sattelzeit, or ‘saddle-time’, is the term coined by Reinhart Koselleck to denote the period of conceptual flux 
dating from approximately 1750 to 1850, during which many modern constellations of meaning emerged. See 
Tribe 1985: x.  
5 Note that ‘vicar’ comes from vicarius, meaning a deputy or substitute, see www.etymonline.com.  
6 Sometimes this involves the woman acting as surrogate using her own eggs combined with artificial 
insemination, which is known as ‘partial surrogacy’; sometimes the woman acts as a ‘carrier’ of the gametes of 
the commissioning couple and/or of gametes donated by third parties, often termed ‘gestational surrogacy’. 
7 Of course, surrogacy arrangements can be, and often are, wholly informal. However, as we will see below, 
even those informal arrangements in which there is no conflict between the parties involved can produce 
problems, for example when the state refuses to recognise those who are parenting the child as the legal 
parents.   
8 Recently in the UK post facto judgments have licensed increasing sums paid as ‘reasonable expenses’. 
9 This is so both for individuals and for populations; with respect to the latter the designation of citizenship on 
the basis of ius sanguinis is especially important. 
10 A ‘rebuttable presumption’ is an assumption of fact accepted by a court until disproved. It is otherwise called a 
disputable presumption.  
11 Though see recent discussions of chimerism, used as a term to describe single organisms composed of two 
distinct zygotes, which complicates the idea that DNA uniformly marks out personhood and filiation.   
12 Re N (A Child) [2008] FLR 177; In the matter of N (A Child) [2007] EWCA Civ 1053; see also H v S (Surrogacy 
Agreement) [2015] EWFC 36. 
13 Note the different valences attached to male and female blood: male blood is spilled in battle, but female 
blood, especially menstrual blood, is often regarded as dirty; see Knight, also Buckley and Gottlieb. 
14 M. R & Anor v. An tArd Chlaraitheoir and Others [2013] IEHC 91; M.R v. An tArd Chlaraitheoir [2014] IESC 60.  
